Saturday, October 18, 2008

The clock is ticking

When an incident has been detected or an event has been escalated to incident status a timer starts. The attacker is now inside your OODA loop. Every minute wasted could be money lost, identities stolen, disruption of operations. He/She controls of, or has access to something of yours and can disrupt your ability to determine the correct measures. The speed and accuracy of your response will make all the difference.

Regarding the OODA loop, there's one thing to remember. The attacker has the initiative, we have to play catch up and out maneuver. In a non automated attack scenario, an attacker has presumably done a reasonable amount of homework on the target host or target network. In the majority of scenarios the attacker has been entrenched in a system for hours, days, weeks or even months before their presence is detected. They are already two or more steps ahead of us. As Incident Responders we are at an immediate disadvantage and we have many foes working against us. Not just the intruder, but many times the local IT staff work against us, albeit unintentionally for the most part.

So, how do we, as incident responders react? What must we do to be effective?

Our response must be fast, accurate, appropriate. What does our OODA loop look like?


Observe:
Confirm Incident - Are we certain we're dealing with an incident?

Threat assessment - What's the threat doing? Is it actively attacking or scouring systems for data? What's the depth of the penetration? What has local staff done already?

Prior Reference - Have we seen this before? What happened then? What's different?

Victim assessment - Is sensitive data present on the system? Where is sensitive data stored, how is it processed?

Business Continuity assessment - Can the system be shut down? How long can the system be down? If the system goes down, what is impacted?

Defense mechanism assessment - What options do we have for containment? How quickly can we enable them?

Orient:

In this portion of the loop we take our various assessments and synthesize and analyze our results. We must weigh them against each other and they feed one another. This is by far the most thought intensive portion of the process. We take large amounts of data must process it quickly as time is of the essence.

Decide:

Decisions need to be made. In a recent incident this phase was done on a whiteboard with a co-worker. We identified what we knew about the scope and gravity of the situation, and what options were available to us. We then, on the best information available at the time made a decision to do a specific set of things. An evaluation takes place during the decision making, generally along the lines of "If I do X, what will happen"?


Act:
At this point we act upon those decisions that make the most sense. Not all decisions get acted upon, because not all decisions are appropriate. Action feeds back in to Observation and Orientation.


Now, recall that this is a loop. It's not a step by step protocol. It's a thinking, living, breathing course of Assessment, testing, action, reaction, and adaptation. We tend to do these things naturally. Assuming the intruder is in the system during a response, they will be working through their own OODA loop and will be attempting to subvert and disrupt your OODA loop.

But wait. What advantages do we have, or rather what advantages does your client have?
The good news is that the battlefield is one of our choosing. We know the landscape and have the opportunity to plan ahead. This is a great place to inject an Incident Response Playbook.

What is an IR playbook? It's a set of protocols that educate responders - from the first responder to the tier 1 responder, and it allows the incident handler to make faster decisions, and provides a control structure for handling the incident. It allows everyone involved a chance to orient themselves to the landscape, thereby speeding up the defender OODA loop. In a playbook, many things can be decided ahead of time, and the answers to questions are already present. For instance we can walk in to an incident already knowing:

1) If sensitive data is on the system, and how it gets processed and stored.
2) What containment options are available.
3) Business continuity can be pre-assessed.

With a playbook we can short circuit the initial OODA loop and improve our response accuracy and speed. Of course we can't always rely upon a playbook. There will be times when the playbook must be thrown out because it doesn't apply to the situation at hand.

All the credit for OODA obviously belongs to John Boyd. A fantastic book is here.

2 comments:

H. Carvey said...

We learned about the OODA loop while I was in training the Marine Corps in '89, but it had been around a long while before then.

The fact is that most IR done today by internal staff is insufficient, due to lack of knowledge and training, and can end up exposing the organization greater risk than the incident itself.

To succeed, you need to tighten your OODA loop and get inside your adversaries. Ultimately, you'd want to make them react to you. However, in too many instances, the intruder's OODA loop has expired and they've succeeded long before the internal staff is able to Observe...

hogfly said...

Definitely. The corps ate up the OODA methodology even though others initially scoffed at the idea.


Response time is a definite limitation. "Temporal proximity" or as I've called it in the past a Window of Risk needs to be closed and detection needs to be faster. I had an incident recently that really reinforced OODA. Detection occurred rapidly, and response was initiated while the attack was ongoing.